Sunday 7 November 2010

The Repeatedly Delayed Responses of the Pentagon Command Center on 9/11


The National Military Command Center
The National Military Command Center (NMCC) is the most secure part of the Pentagon and, at the time of the 9/11 attacks, was "the focal point within [the] Department of Defense for providing assistance" to law enforcement efforts in response to aircraft hijackings in U.S. airspace, according to military instructions. [1] In response to the attacks on New York and Washington, the job of the NMCC, according to the 9/11 Commission, was "to gather the relevant parties and establish the chain of command between the National Command Authority--the president and the secretary of defense--and those who need to carry out their orders." [2]

The NMCC therefore had a critical role to play that day. And yet evidence reveals that emergency actions conducted from the center were totally inadequate. Numerous obstructions occurred, including technical problems and outside agencies failing to provide the center with the information it required. Furthermore, a number of military leaders were particularly slow in reaching the NMCC, from where they could assist emergency response efforts, and only arrived there after the attacks ended and it was too late to make a difference.

The evidence currently available is insufficient to draw firm conclusions from. But the sheer number of factors that hindered the actions of those in the NMCC, combined with several oddities, raises the possibility that a deliberate and coordinated attempt was made by treasonous U.S. government and military insiders to sabotage the center's ability to respond to the 9/11 attacks, at a time when its rapid actions were imperative.

THE U.S. MILITARY'S 'WORLDWIDE NERVE CENTER'
The NMCC has been described as "a communications hub, a switchboard connecting the Pentagon, the civilian government, and the combatant commanders." [3] It is a maze of offices, cubicles, and conference rooms in an area of the Pentagon where offices of the military's Joint Staff and many top officials, including the secretary of defense, are located. The center is designed to operate in an emergency, and has its own electrical, heating, and air-conditioning systems. [4]

The NMCC's primary task is to monitor worldwide events for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Its other main missions are providing a strategic watch component and providing a crisis response component. At the time of the 9/11 attacks, it was operated by five teams on a rotating basis, with each operations team typically having 17 to 20 personnel on duty and performing a variety of functions. [5]

OFFICERS LACKED URGENCY IN RESPONSE TO FIRST CRASH
The morning of September 11, 2001, the NMCC was receiving live feeds from numerous television stations, which its personnel were monitoring, and those in the NMCC learned of the first plane crashing into the World Trade Center from TV news reports. [6] This was reportedly the first time they learned anything of the crisis in the skies over America that morning. [7]

NMCC personnel supposedly didn't realize that the crash was a terrorist attack. Operations officer Dan Mangino has recalled, "At first, we thought it was a terrible accident." [8] Major Charles Chambers recalled, "My instinct was that the pilot had used the towers to point himself towards the area, lost consciousness, and autopilot had done the rest." Therefore, at that time, "Our interest in the crash ... was no different from anyone else's in the country." [9]

The operations team's response was to continue monitoring media reports and make notifications up the chain of command, simply telling senior Pentagon officials that a plane had crashed into one of the WTC towers. [10]

NMCC STAFF UNAWARE OF CRISIS TAKING PLACE
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) only informed the NMCC of the first hijacking on September 11--of American Airlines Flight 11--at about 9:00 a.m., 14 minutes after that plane hit the WTC and more than 45 minutes after it is supposed to have been hijacked. At that time, Lieutenant Colonel Ryan Gonsalves, the senior operations officer in the NMCC, called the FAA operations center at the agency's Washington, DC, headquarters, seeking information on the crisis. The person that answered the call told Gonsalves that the FAA had a report of the hijacking of Flight 11, which was flying from Boston to Los Angeles. However, the FAA employee apparently did not realize this was the plane that had crashed into the WTC, and told Gonsalves that Flight 11 was "now en route" to JFK International Airport in New York. Furthermore, the FAA employee made no request for help from the military: There was no discussion of possibly scrambling fighter jets to go after the hijacked plane, and when Gonsalves asked if the FAA needed assistance dealing with the hijacking, he was told, "No," and that the pilot "had called in and said everything was under control, and he was going to land at New York shortly." [11]

According to military instructions, the NMCC should have been "notified by the most expeditious means by the FAA" in response to an aircraft hijacking in U.S. airspace. [12] And yet, as we can see, the NMCC learned of the hijacking of Flight 11 when it called the FAA, not vice-versa. The 9/11 Commission Report pointed out that although "FAA headquarters began to follow the hijack protocol" after air traffic controllers concluded that Flight 11 had been hijacked, at around 8:25 a.m., it "did not contact the NMCC to request a fighter escort." [13]

The NMCC's alarming lack of awareness of the crisis taking place that morning continued, as was apparent when the Pentagon was struck at 9:37 a.m. Captain Charles Leidig, who was temporarily in charge of operations in the NMCC during the terrorist attacks, told the 9/11 Commission that "he recalled his situational awareness on the Pentagon crash as being [caused by] an aircraft was from CNN." [14] Steve Hahn, an operations officer in the NMCC that morning, has recalled, "I didn't know [the Pentagon had been hit] until I heard the news report on television." [15] Charles Chambers said that when the Pentagon was hit (on the opposite side of the building to where the NMCC is located), he "heard a strange faint rattling noise through the air ducts and felt a slight vibration." However, he added, "I didn't hear or feel anything else so I didn't pay it much mind." He only realized the Pentagon had been attacked when he subsequently saw this being reported on TV. [16]

OFFICERS UNUSUALLY CALM IN RESPONSE TO ATTACKS
NMCC personnel saw United Airlines Flight 175 hitting the South Tower of the World Trade Center live on television at 9:03 a.m. They then, reportedly, realized the nature of what was happening. Leidig has said that to him "it was obvious it was a terrorist attack or a coordinated attack." Dan Mangino recalled that the staff in the NMCC now "knew immediately that it was a terrorist attack." [17]

According to Leidig, the NMCC "then became a focal point for coordinating information flow." [18] And yet evidence suggests a level of urgency among those in the center far less than we might reasonably expect, considering this was the first attack on America in 60 years. Mangino has said that "he knew he would have little time in the days ahead, so he quickly ran to the concourse to get some money out of an automated teller machine." He only arrived back at the NMCC sometime after 9:37 a.m., when the Pentagon was hit. Would a military officer in such a key position really have popped out to get money from an ATM if he genuinely believed the U.S. was in the middle of a massive terrorist attack?

Even after the Pentagon was hit, personnel in the NMCC remained very calm. When Mangino arrived back at the center, he was reportedly "greeted by a sea of calm." He has recalled, "There was no panic, no raised voices." His colleague Steve Hahn similarly recalled that the atmosphere in the NMCC "was very professional and very calm." [19] And Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Richard Myers has said that when he arrived at the NMCC, reportedly at around 10:00 a.m., "all the officers on duty were working calmly at their stations, despite the smoke wafting in through the ventilation system, the fact that the Pentagon had just been struck, and the distracting blast of the evacuation alarm." [20]

It is plausible that this calmness was simply an example of the professionalism of the NMCC personnel. As Mangino noted, "We train for emergencies all the time and that training took over." [21] But other evidence of the NMCC personnel's lack of urgency makes this possibility seem less likely. It is particularly notable that the man who should have been in charge of the center's response to the crisis was allowed to remain in a pre-scheduled meeting, unrelated to the attacks, and did not return to his post until more than an hour after the second WTC tower was hit.

NMCC DIRECTOR STAYED IN PRE-SCHEDULED MEETING
Brigadier General Montague Winfield should have been on duty as the deputy director for operations (DDO) in the NMCC throughout the 9/11 attacks, in command of the operations team there. [22] The DDO's responsibilities in a crisis include establishing and moderating an appropriate conference call between military commanders and other relevant agencies, and generating a military response. [23] But, curiously, the previous afternoon, Winfield asked his colleague, Charles Leidig, to take over from him as DDO for a portion of his duty on the morning of September 11, and Leidig agreed to do so.

Leidig--whose usual job was as the deputy for Command Center operations, responsible for the maintenance, operation, and training of the NMCC's watch teams--had joined the operations directorate of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in July 2001, and only qualified to stand in as the DDO in the NMCC about a month before 9/11. He therefore lacked Winfield's experience that would surely have been invaluable when organizing a response to the attacks on the U.S. [24]

The reason Winfield wanted Leidig to take his place as DDO on September 11 appears to have been because he was scheduled to attend a meeting that morning. This was a "closed-door personnel meeting convened by the Air Force to discuss the rating of Air Force officers," according to one 9/11 Commission memorandum. [25] Another Commission memorandum described it as a "session for general officers who rated Air Force officers." Leidig therefore replaced Winfield as DDO at 8:30 a.m. on September 11, 16 minutes before the first plane hit the WTC. [26]

One would reasonably expect someone to have fetched Winfield from his meeting when the second plane hit the WTC and officers in the NMCC "knew immediately that it was a terrorist attack," if not before. [27] And yet that did not happen. Winfield only returned to his post more than an hour later, after Flight 93 apparently crashed in Pennsylvania and the 9/11 attacks had ended.

It is unclear if Winfield and the other officers with him in the meeting were informed immediately of the second attack. It is also unclear when exactly Winfield arrived back in the NMCC, and whether he then resumed his duties as DDO immediately, or instead allowed Leidig to continue in his place even while he was available to return to his post. Leidig told the 9/11 Commission he was "certain that Winfield returned" from the meeting "after the Pentagon was hit" at 9:37 a.m. [28] He also said Winfield took over from him as DDO "right after we resolved what was going on with United 93," meaning at some time after 10:03 a.m. Leidig added that a report over a conference call at 10:37 a.m., about an anonymous threat made against Air Force One, occurred "right after I was relieved on the watch by General Winfield." [29] This would suggest that Winfield returned to his post at around 10:30 a.m.

The closest the 9/11 Commission came to providing an explanation for Winfield avoiding his crucial responsibilities, and instead staying in an unimportant, pre-scheduled meeting, was to state in a memorandum that "such meetings" as Winfield was attending "are generally not disturbed unless the reason is significant." [30] But a major terrorist attack in the U.S. was highly significant. So why didn't Winfield immediately return to his post when the second WTC tower was hit? And why didn't anyone in the NMCC promptly fetch him from the meeting at that time?

Considering the countless oddities that have been identified around the military's response to the 9/11 attacks, we surely need to contemplate the possibility of a more sinister explanation for this apparent lack of urgency among those whose job it was to run the NMCC on September 11. For example, might their calmness have been because they thought the terrorist attacks were in fact simulated as part of a training exercise that morning, rather than being a genuine, real-world emergency? Under such circumstances, it would have been much easier for them to remain calm. It is possible that those in the NMCC could have thought the terrorist attacks were being simulated even when television footage clearly showed what was happening. For example, personnel at an Army base near New York that was conducting an antiterrorism training exercise that morning actually thought TV footage of the burning WTC was an elaborate training video accompanying their exercise. One worker told a training officer, "You really outdid yourself this time." [31]

EMERGENCY CONFERENCE ONLY BEGAN AT 9:29 A.M.
Another area of concern is the serious problems experienced by NMCC personnel in convening and running an emergency teleconference to deal with the terrorist attacks. The NMCC had specific procedures in place to manage a crisis. A 9/11 Commission memorandum described, "As a particular event unfolds, the first action is to convene a significant event conference to gather and disseminate information from government entities according to established checklists." [32] However, Charles Chambers recalled that the NMCC's significant event conference in response to the 9/11 attacks "was taking much longer than expected to bring up." [33] Commander Patrick Gardner, the assistant DDO, told the 9/11 Commission that the NMCC was "struggling to build the conference," which "didn't get off as quickly as hoped," and complained of his "frustration that it wasn't brought up more quickly." [34] The significant event conference only began at 9:29 a.m., 26 minutes after Flight 175 hit the WTC. [35]

At least two factors that contributed to this alarming delay in establishing the conference have been identified: disruption resulting from some NMCC officers having to participate in another conference call that was reportedly of no use in aiding the emergency response to the attacks, and problems connecting some agencies--particularly the FAA--to the NMCC's conference.

UNHELPFUL CIA CONFERENCE DELAYED NMCC RESPONSE
A National Operations and Intelligence Watch Officer Network (NOIWON) conference call was convened by the CIA, reportedly at sometime between 9:16 a.m. and 9:25 a.m. on September 11, to allow government agencies in the Washington area to quickly share information regarding the ongoing crisis. [36] But this call appears to have hindered, rather than helped, emergency response efforts. According to a 9/11 Commission memorandum, while the NMCC was preparing for the significant event conference, the "NOIWON call intervened. The NMCC abandoned its attempt to convene a [significant event conference] so its watch officers could participate in the NOIWON conference." [37]

What is more, the disruption was apparently for nothing. An intelligence officer working at FAA headquarters that morning said that he "does not remember any useful or significant information coming as a result of the NOIWON call." [38] And Charles Leidig told the 9/11 Commission that he "recalled no situational awareness that came from the NOIWON call." [39]

NMCC HAD PROBLEMS CONNECTING TO CIVIL AGENCIES
Attempts to convene the significant event conference were also delayed because, as Charles Chambers recalled, "a couple of the civil agencies" that were going to be included in the conference "couldn't be reached, and others kept dropping off moments after connecting." [40] Leidig finally announced that the NMCC would have to start without those agencies, which could be added to the conference later on. [41]

The significant event conference was brought to an end after just five minutes, and resumed at 9:37 a.m. as an "air threat conference," which continued for over eight hours. [42] According to Chambers, air threat conferences are used when aircraft are considered hostile and involve many more people than are in a significant event conference. But, like the previous conference, "it took longer than expected" to convene the air threat conference. There were again problems connecting some agencies to it. Other agencies hadn't understood what Leidig meant about establishing a new conference, and so they didn't hang up when the previous conference call was disconnected. Therefore, Chambers recalled, "All we got from them was a busy signal." [43]

FAA OUT OF COMMUNICATION
Considering the FAA's crucial responsibilities in responding to hijackings, it is of particular concern that there were serious problems connecting the agency to the NMCC's conference calls. According to military instructions, the FAA administrator had "exclusive responsibility to direct law enforcement activity related to actual or attempted aircraft piracy (hijacking) in the 'special aircraft jurisdiction' of the United States." [44] But when the FAA was asked to provide an update over the significant event conference right after it started, the line was silent. [45] Charles Leidig recalled that the FAA was only "intermittently in," and "most of the time they were not in the conference." He said the problems connecting the FAA to the conference, which occurred "throughout the morning ... hampered information flow to some degree." [46] Charles Chambers complained that because "the FAA wasn't in the conference, they couldn't go secure, and so we couldn't get first-hand information from them." [47]

According to the 9/11 Commission Report, although operators at the NMCC "worked feverishly to include the FAA" in the conference, they had "equipment problems and difficulty finding secure phone numbers." [48] Staff Sergeant Val Harrison, who was responsible for setting up the NMCC's conference calls, tried contacting the operations center at FAA headquarters so as to connect the agency to the air threat conference, but had difficulty getting through. She finally asked the White House switchboard to help her out, but even after a line with the FAA had been established, it was repeatedly lost. [49]

The explanations that have been put forward for these difficulties connecting the FAA to the conference have been vague at best. One 9/11 Commission memorandum attributed them simply to "technical problems." [50] Leidig told the 9/11 Commission it was his understanding that there had been some "compatibility issues" between the FAA's secure phone and the secure phones in the NMCC, though he said he was unaware of the technical aspects of the problem. [51] In light of the numerous other factors that disrupted the NMCC's emergency response that morning, it would be worth carefully investigating whether these problems were in fact the result of a deliberate attempt to sabotage communications between government agencies, so as to make sure the attacks on New York and Washington proceeded unhindered.

FAA REPRESENTATIVE LACKED RELEVANT KNOWLEDGE
What is more, when an FAA representative finally joined the air threat conference, at 10:17 a.m., that person was far from adequate for providing the conference with the information it required. The representative was Rayford Brooks, who was working in the Central Altitude Reservation Function (CARF) at the FAA's Command Center in Herndon, Virginia. Brooks was a most inappropriate person to have representing the FAA on the conference. According to the 9/11 Commission Report, he had "no familiarity with or responsibility for hijackings, no access to decisionmakers, and none of the information available to senior FAA officials."

Brooks only arrived at the Command Center at about 9:30 a.m. and had not been listening to the radio while driving there. As he told the 9/11 Commission, he had "no situational awareness." After arriving at the Command Center, Brooks was not given any instructions regarding the air threat conference or other operational matters. Brooks in fact should not have been on the conference in the first place. He had to join it in place of one of the military officers working in the Air Traffic Services Cell (ATSC), a small office next to the CARF at the Command Center. According to Brooks, the ATSC asked the CARF to monitor the air threat conference on its behalf because it did not have a working secure phone. [52]

Considering the critical role the FAA was required to play in responding to aircraft hijackings, we could reasonably expect a far more knowledgeable FAA employee than Rayford Brooks to have been participating in the NMCC's conference when hijackings were actually taking place. With all the people working at the FAA's Command Center that morning, was there really no one more suitable available?

TOP OFFICIALS REACHED NMCC TOO LATE TO HELP
We can see that numerous factors hindered the actions of those in the NMCC in response to the 9/11 attacks. It is also worth noting that several key officials who should ideally have been in the NMCC while the attacks were taking place were absent from the center, and arrived there only when it was too late to make a difference:

• As already mentioned, Brigadier General Montague Winfield left his position as the deputy director for operations in the NMCC at 8:30 a.m. and only resumed his duties after the attacks ended, apparently around 10:30 a.m.

• Donald Rumsfeld, who as secretary of defense had a vital role to play in defending his country against the terrorist attacks, was at the Pentagon that morning, and yet he too only reached the NMCC after the attacks ended. Rumsfeld learned of the first attack in New York during a breakfast meeting he was holding for several members of Congress. He then returned to his office for his daily CIA intelligence briefing. [53] After the second plane hit the WTC, a couple of Rumsfeld's colleague's went and informed him of this and said that the crisis management process was starting up. But Rumsfeld supposedly "wanted to make a few phone calls," and so remained in his office. [54] After hearing and feeling the explosion when the Pentagon was hit, Rumsfeld still did not head to the NMCC. He instead went outside and helped carry an injured person on a stretcher. After returning to the building, he initially went back to his office. [55] He finally arrived at the NMCC and joined the air threat conference at around 10:30 a.m. [56] Lieutenant Colonel Robert Darling--who on September 11 served as a liaison between the White House Situation Room, Vice President Dick Cheney, and the NMCC--has stated the problem with Rumsfeld's actions that morning. Darling wrote: "I ... believe Secretary Rumsfeld's appointed place of duty was at the helm in the NMCC that day. ... The real questions still remain; why did Secretary Rumsfeld abandon his post that day by not responding to the National Military Command Center the moment the attack on our county was realized?" [57]

• General Henry Shelton, who as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was the highest ranking military officer in the U.S. armed forces, had taken off at around 7:30 a.m. on a military aircraft, and was flying across the Atlantic for a NATO conference in Hungary when the terrorist attacks occurred. Shelton ordered that his plane turn around and return to Washington. [58] However, he only arrived at the NMCC at around 5:40 p.m. [59]

• General Richard Myers, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was on Capitol Hill that morning and, despite seeing the coverage of the first crash in New York on television shortly before 9:00 a.m., continued into his scheduled meeting with Senator Max Cleland. [60] Myers learned of the second attack on the WTC either while he was with Cleland or just after he left the meeting (accounts conflict on this matter). [61] Some accounts indicate that Myers only left the Capitol building to return to the Pentagon around the time of the Pentagon attack. [62] Myers told the 9/11 Commission that he arrived at the NMCC at around 10:00 a.m. or 10:10 a.m. [63] But he further delayed joining the air threat conference by initially leaving the NMCC and heading out to the secretary of defense's office suite, in search of Donald Rumsfeld. Only after an aide there told him that Rumsfeld had gone outside did Myers return to the NMCC. [64]

• As director of operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Vice Admiral Scott Fry was "responsible for keeping the National Military Command Center operating," according to authors Patrick Creed and Rick Newman. [65] Despite being informed of the first plane hitting the WTC as he was about to leave his office in the Pentagon, Fry continued out to a 9:00 a.m. appointment with his dentist. He reportedly cut short that appointment promptly after his assistant called him on his cell phone when the second plane hit the WTC. But Fry then went not to the NMCC but to the Executive Support Center, located upstairs from it. [66] Fry is reported as having been in the NMCC later on that day, although the time he arrived there, and whether he participated in the air threat conference, is unstated. [67]

Any new investigation of 9/11 would need to determine the extent to which the absence of these key officials from the NMCC hindered the military's response to the attacks. In light of all the other suspicious evidence, it should be seriously considered whether the absence of any of these individuals had been pre-arranged as part of a deliberate attempt at paralyzing the U.S. military, to prevent it from stopping the attacks.

UNRELEASED EVIDENCE DETAILS NMCC'S ACTIONS ON 9/11
We know of several records in existence that would reveal more about what happened in the NMCC on September 11, 2001, and these records would surely be of much use to any new investigations. They include an after action report produced by the NMCC, on its response to the 9/11 attacks, based on notes and other contemporaneous documents. [68] We also know the NMCC's air threat conference call was recorded, and the Pentagon produced a 200-page classified transcript from the recording. [69] Furthermore, a senior officer in the NMCC told the 9/11 Commission that he removed all the tapes from phones and other machines in the NMCC following the 9/11 attacks, and saved them in the DDO's cabinet. Presumably these tapes still exist. [70]

Even without access to important records like these, the limited evidence that is already available shows that an alarming number of factors hindered the emergency response to the 9/11 attacks that was being coordinated from within the NMCC. Considering the U.S. military's failure to stop those attacks, this is something of much concern. We need to know a lot more about what was going on in the NMCC on September 11. And serious attempts need to be made to determine whether deliberate and coordinated actions were undertaken by treasonous U.S. government and military insiders, to disrupt the efforts of the NMCC to put together an effective response to the attacks.

NOTES
[1] "Washington's Heroes." Newsweek, September 28, 2001; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCSI 3610.01A: Aircraft Piracy (Hijacking) and Destruction of Derelict Airborne Objects. Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 1, 2001.
[2] 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004, p. 37.
[3] Richard B. Myers and Malcolm McConnell, Eyes on the Horizon: Serving on the Front Lines of National Security. New York: Threshold Editions, 2009, p. 151.
[4] Steve Vogel, The Pentagon: A History. New York: Random House, 2007, p. 440; Patrick Creed and Rick Newman, Firefight: Inside the Battle to Save the Pentagon on 9/11. New York: Presidio Press, 2008, pp. 171-172.
[5] "Memorandum for the Record: Orientation and Tour of the National Military Command Center (NMCC) and National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC)." 9/11 Commission, July 21, 2003.
[6] Ibid.; "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Captain Charles Joseph Leidig, USN, Commandant of Midshipmen, U.S. Naval Academy." 9/11 Commission, April 29, 2004; Jim Garamone, "9/11: Keeping the Heart of the Pentagon Beating." American Forces Press Service, September 7, 2006.
[7] 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 35.
[8] Jim Garamone, "9/11: Keeping the Heart of the Pentagon Beating."
[9] Charles Chambers, "Notes on 9/11, Maj. C. Chambers, NMCC, Made Within the Week of 9/11." U.S. Department of Defense, September 2001.
[10] "Memorandum for the Record: Orientation and Tour of the National Military Command Center (NMCC) and National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC)"; "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Captain Charles Joseph Leidig, USN, Commandant of Midshipmen, U.S. Naval Academy."
[11] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Captain Charles Joseph Leidig, USN, Commandant of Midshipmen, U.S. Naval Academy"; Commander Patrick Gardner, 9/11 Commission Interview Part I, Handwritten Notes. 9/11 Commission, May 5, 2004; 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 4, 35, 462.
[12] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCSI 3610.01A.
[13] 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 19.
[14] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Captain Charles Joseph Leidig, USN, Commandant of Midshipmen, U.S. Naval Academy."
[15] Jim Garamone, "9/11: Keeping the Heart of the Pentagon Beating."
[16] Charles Chambers, "Notes on 9/11, Maj. C. Chambers, NMCC, Made Within the Week of 9/11."
[17] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Captain Charles Joseph Leidig, USN, Commandant of Midshipmen, U.S. Naval Academy"; Jim Garamone, "9/11: Keeping the Heart of the Pentagon Beating."
[18] National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States: Twelfth Public Hearing. 9/11 Commission, June 17, 2004.
[19] Jim Garamone, "9/11: Keeping the Heart of the Pentagon Beating."
[20] Richard B. Myers and Malcolm McConnell, Eyes on the Horizon, pp. 151-152.
[21] Jim Garamone, "9/11: Keeping the Heart of the Pentagon Beating."
[22] "Memorandum for the Record: Orientation and Tour of the National Military Command Center (NMCC) and National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC)."
[23] Charles Chambers, "Notes on 9/11, Maj. C. Chambers, NMCC, Made Within the Week of 9/11"; "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Captain Charles Joseph Leidig, USN, Commandant of Midshipmen, U.S. Naval Academy"; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States: Twelfth Public Hearing.
[24] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Captain Charles Joseph Leidig, USN, Commandant of Midshipmen, U.S. Naval Academy"; "Statement of Capt. Charles J. Leidig, Jr., Commandant of Midshipmen, United States Naval Academy, Before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States." 9/11 Commission, June 17, 2004.
[25] "Memorandum for the Record: Orientation and Tour of the National Military Command Center (NMCC) and National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC)."
[26] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Captain Charles Joseph Leidig, USN, Commandant of Midshipmen, U.S. Naval Academy"; "Statement of Capt. Charles J. Leidig, Jr., Commandant of Midshipmen, United States Naval Academy, Before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States."
[27] Jim Garamone, "9/11: Keeping the Heart of the Pentagon Beating."
[28] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Captain Charles Joseph Leidig, USN, Commandant of Midshipmen, U.S. Naval Academy."
[29] National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States: Twelfth Public Hearing.
[30] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Captain Charles Joseph Leidig, USN, Commandant of Midshipmen, U.S. Naval Academy."
[31] Debbie Sheehan, "Force Protection Plan a 'Timely Alert.'" Monmouth Message, September 21, 2001; Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, U.S. Army Communications-Electronics Command, A Concise History of the Communications-Electronics Command and Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. Fort Monmouth, NJ: Fort Monmouth, 2003, p. 71.
[32] "Memorandum for the Record: Orientation and Tour of the National Military Command Center (NMCC) and National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC)."
[33] Charles Chambers, "Notes on 9/11, Maj. C. Chambers, NMCC, Made Within the Week of 9/11."
[34] Commander Patrick Gardner, 9/11 Commission Interview Part I, Handwritten Notes; Commander Patrick Gardner, 9/11 Commission Interview Take 2, Handwritten Notes. 9/11 Commission, May 12, 2004.
[35] 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 37.
[36] David A. Radi, "Intelligence Inside the White House: The Influence of Executive Style and Technology." Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Program on Information Resources Policy, March 1997, p. 12; "Chronology of Events on 9/11/01." Federal Aviation Administration, September 11, 2001; "ACI Watch Log." Federal Aviation Administration, September 11, 2001; Bob Brewin, "The Consumer's Guide to Intel Nets." Government Executive, June 1, 2009.
[37] "Memorandum for the Record: Orientation and Tour of the National Military Command Center (NMCC) and National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC)."
[38] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Darrel Smith." 9/11 Commission, July 13, 2004.
[39] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Captain Charles Joseph Leidig, USN, Commandant of Midshipmen, U.S. Naval Academy."
[40] Charles Chambers, "Notes on 9/11, Maj. C. Chambers, NMCC, Made Within the Week of 9/11."
[41] Commander Patrick Gardner, 9/11 Commission Interview Take 2, Handwritten Notes.
[42] 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 37.
[43] Charles Chambers, "Notes on 9/11, Maj. C. Chambers, NMCC, Made Within the Week of 9/11."
[44] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCSI 3610.01A.
[45] 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 37.
[46] National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States: Twelfth Public Hearing.
[47] Charles Chambers, "Notes on 9/11, Maj. C. Chambers, NMCC, Made Within the Week of 9/11."
[48] 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 37.
[49] Charles Chambers, "Notes on 9/11, Maj. C. Chambers, NMCC, Made Within the Week of 9/11"; "Memorandum for the Record: Orientation and Tour of the National Military Command Center (NMCC) and National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC)."
[50] "Memorandum for the Record: Orientation and Tour of the National Military Command Center (NMCC) and National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC)."
[51] National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States: Twelfth Public Hearing.
[52] Rayford Brooks, 9/11 Commission Interview, Handwritten Notes. 9/11 Commission, April 15, 2004; 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 37, 463.
[53] 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 37; Steve Vogel, The Pentagon, p. 428.
[54] Assistant Secretary Clarke Interview With WBZ Boston. WBZ Boston, September 15, 2001; Torie Clarke, Lipstick on a Pig: Winning in the No-Spin Era by Someone Who Knows the Game. New York: Free Press, 2006, pp. 218-219.
[55] Don Van Natta and Lizette Alvarez, "A Hijacked Boeing 757 Slams Into the Pentagon, Halting the Government." New York Times, September 12, 2001; Alfred Goldberg et al., Pentagon 9/11. Washington, DC: Defense Department, Office of the Secretary, Historical Office, 2007, pp. 130-131.
[56] 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 38.
[57] Robert J. Darling, 24 Hours Inside the President's Bunker: 9/11/01 The White House. Bloomington, IN: iUniverse, 2010, pp. 108-109.
[58] Draft: The Air Traffic Organization's Response to the September 11th Terrorist Attack: ATC System Assessment, Shutdown, and Restoration. Federal Aviation Administration, March 21, 2002, p. G-1; Hugh Shelton, Ronald Levinson, and Malcolm McConnell, Without Hesitation: The Odyssey of an American Warrior. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2010, pp. 430-432.
[59] Richard B. Myers and Malcolm McConnell, Eyes on the Horizon, p. 159.
[60] Richard Myers, Interview by Jim Miklaszewski. NBC News, September 11, 2002; "History Makers Series: General Richard B. Myers, U.S. Air Force (Retired), Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff." Council on Foreign Relations, June 29, 2006.
[61] Interview, General Richard B. Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, With Petty Officer Quinn Lyton, USN. Armed Forces Radio and Television Service, October 17, 2001; Richard Myers, Interview by Jim Miklaszewski; Richard B. Myers and Malcolm McConnell, Eyes on the Horizon, p. 8.
[62] Interview, General Richard B. Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, With Petty Officer Quinn Lyton, USN; Richard Myers, Interview by Jim Miklaszewski; "Statement of General Richard Myers, USAF, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, Before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States." 9/11 Commission, June 17, 2004; "History Makers Series: General Richard B. Myers, U.S. Air Force (Retired), Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff."
[63] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Richard Myers, Affiliated With NORAD." 9/11 Commission, February 17, 2004.
[64] Richard B. Myers and Malcolm McConnell, Eyes on the Horizon, pp. 152-153.
[65] Patrick Creed and Rick Newman, Firefight, p. xvii.
[66] Ibid. pp. 4-6.
[67] Ibid. p. 288.
[68] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Captain Charles Joseph Leidig, USN, Commandant of Midshipmen, U.S. Naval Academy."
[69] Chitra Ragavan and Mark Mazzetti, "Pieces of the Puzzle." U.S. News & World Report, August 31, 2003.
[70] "Memorandum for the Record: Orientation and Tour of the National Military Command Center (NMCC) and National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC)."

Wednesday 8 September 2010

The 9/11 Time Discrepancy Oddity: Distress Signals Indicated Planes Crashed Minutes BEFORE Flights 11 and 175 Hit the WTC


Flight 175 approaching the World Trade Center
Radio transmitters that are carried aboard aircraft and that are supposed to activate only in the event of the aircraft crashing went off in the New York area several minutes before the two planes hit the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. In events that, according to the official account of 9/11, should have been impossible, emergency locator transmitters (ELTs), which are intended to help locate crashed aircraft by broadcasting a distinctive signal, were activated over two minutes before American Airlines Flight 11 hit the north WTC tower and over four minutes before United Airlines Flight 175 hit the South Tower. And yet no ELTs went off at the times these planes hit the towers, when we might have expected them to have been activated.

EMERGENCY TRANSMITTER WENT OFF OVER TWO MINUTES BEFORE FLIGHT 11 CRASHED
American Airlines Flight 11 hit the North Tower of the World Trade Center at 8:46 a.m. and 40 seconds. [1] But two and a half minutes earlier, David Bottiglia, an air traffic controller at the FAA's New York Center, had received an important message from one of the planes in the airspace he was monitoring. At 8:44 a.m., the pilot of U.S. Airways Flight 583 told Bottiglia: "I just picked up an ELT on 121.5. It was brief, but it went off." (121.5 megahertz is an emergency frequency that ELTs are designed to transmit their distress signals on.) A minute later--about 90 second before Flight 11 hit the WTC--another plane in the New York Center's airspace reported the same thing. The pilot of Delta Airlines Flight 2433 told Bottiglia: "We picked up that ELT, too. But it's very faint." [2] According to author Lynn Spencer, "several" facilities picked up the ELT signal around this time. [3]

Peter McCloskey, a traffic management coordinator at the New York Center, later recalled that the ELT had gone off "in the vicinity of Lower Manhattan." [4] And, around the time Flight 11 hit the WTC, a participant in an FAA teleconference stated, "We got a report of an ELT in the area that [the radar track for Flight 11] was in." (Before it disappeared from radar screens, the track for Flight 11 had indicated the plane was about 20 miles from New York's JFK International Airport.) [5]

However, while an ELT went off minutes before Flight 11 hit the WTC, it appears that no ELT went off at the time of the crash itself.

EMERGENCY TRANSMITTER WENT OFF OVER FOUR MINUTES BEFORE FLIGHT 175 CRASHED
United Airlines Flight 175 hit the South Tower of the World Trade Center at 9:03 a.m. and 11 seconds. [6] But, as with the first crash, an ELT was activated in the New York area several minutes before this plane hit the tower.

At just before 8:59 a.m., over four minutes before the Flight 175 crash, the pilot of Flight 583, who had reported the ELT signal before the North Tower was struck, told David Bottiglia at the New York Center that he had noticed another ELT going off. The pilot said, "I hate to keep burdening you with this stuff, but now we're picking up another ELT on 21.5." [7]

As with the previous crash, although an ELT went off minutes before Flight 175 hit the South Tower, it seems that no ELT went off at the time of the crash itself.

ELT SHOULD ONLY GO OFF IN EVENT OF A CRASH
An emergency locator transmitter is a battery-operated radio transmitter carried by aircraft, which can emit a distinctive signal on the emergency frequencies of 121.5 and 243.0 megahertz. When "armed," an ELT is designed to automatically activate in the event of a crash and then continually emit the emergency signal, thereby helping rescuers to locate the crashed aircraft. [8] ELTs are required to be installed in almost all U.S.-registered civil aircraft. [9]

Paul Thumser, an operations supervisor at the FAA's New York Center on 9/11, has over 20 years' experience as an air traffic controller and is also an experienced airline pilot. He provided the 9/11 Commission with detailed information about ELTs. Thumser said the ELT in a Boeing 767--the type of plane that hit both of the WTC towers--cannot be activated by a pilot. Therefore, with a 767, "impact would be the only way to trigger one." Furthermore, the sensitivity setting of the ELT in a 767 "is not low," and so it should be impossible for one to be set off by the plane making a hard turn or a hard landing. Thumser therefore judged that "it would have to be a serious impact to set the ELT off." [10] Terry Biggio, the operations manager at the FAA's Boston Center, similarly told the 9/11 Commission: "An ELT is not a signal sent by pilot operators. It is clearly indicative of a crash." [11]

This means that an ELT should not have been activated over two minutes before Flight 11 hit the North Tower, nor should one have been activated over four minutes before Flight 175 hit the South Tower. If such transmitters on Flights 11 and 175 had been set off, this should have happened when these planes struck the WTC, and yet that did not happen. It was perhaps for this reason that Mike McCormick, the air traffic control manager at the FAA's New York Center, told the 9/11 Commission that his "best hypothesis" was that the ELT signal transmitted "moments before the impact of AA 11" was "unrelated to the event" of the crash. [12]

McCormick also told the 9/11 Commission that ELT signals sometimes "happened accidentally," and that "the vast majority are false alarms." [13] However, this could not have been the case with the signals before the WTC crashes. None of the air traffic controllers who were involved with monitoring Flights 11 and 175 have reported any planes' ELTs going off by accident around that time. And for one plane in the New York area to have its ELT set off accidentally just before Flight 11 hit the WTC, and then the ELT on another plane in that area going off accidentally just before Flight 175 hit the WTC, would have been too big a coincidence to be plausible.

INEXPLICABLE EVIDENCE
The strange evidence of emergency locator transmitter signals being broadcast in the New York area before the World Trade Center towers were hit raises serious questions about the official account of the 9/11 attacks. According to that account, if ELTs had been activated, this should have been at the times the planes hit the towers, not several minutes beforehand. [14] The evidence appears inexplicable, and so proper investigation is imperative to make sense of it. But while a number of air traffic controllers mentioned the ELT signals in their interviews with the 9/11 Commission, the 9/11 Commission Report offered no explanation for this anomalous evidence.

Many questions remain unanswered. For example, were the sources of the ELT signals ever determined? If so, did the signals indeed come from the planes that hit the WTC, or were they from somewhere else? And were the transmitters themselves ever found? After all, according to the FAA, "In most installations the [ELT] is attached to the aircraft structure as far aft as practicable in the fuselage; or in the tail surface, in such a manner that damage to the beacon will be minimized in the event of a crash impact." [15] So the transmitters should have survived the crashes, if they were in the planes that hit the Twin Towers. If the ELTs were found, then, were they indeed in the rubble of the World Trade Center? Or were they somewhere else?

Paul Thumser told the 9/11 Commission that "credible" ELT signals (i.e. those not determined to be false alarms) had to be reported to the Air Force Rescue Coordination Center (AFRCC), which, at the time of the 9/11 attacks, was located at Langley Air Force Base in Virginia. [16] So did the AFRCC locate the sources of the ELT signals or determine anything else about them? The only relevant information provided by the 9/11 Commission appears in one of its memorandums, which stated, "We visited the RCC and they receive all ELTs; so many, in fact, that they are a nuisance, and they have special procedures and software to manage that." [17]

We clearly need to know a lot more, since a proper investigation of these emergency signals could help determine what exactly happened on September 11, and point investigators toward those really responsible for perpetrating the terrorist attacks.

NOTES
[1] 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004, p. 7.
[2] "Transcript of United Airlines Flight 175." New York Times, October 16, 2001; "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) New York Air Route Center Interview With David Bottiglia." 9/11 Commission, October 1, 2003; "Sensitive Security Information: Chronology of September 11, 2001." Federal Aviation Administration, n.d.
[3] Lynn Spencer, Touching History: The Untold Story of the Drama That Unfolded in the Skies Over America on 9/11. New York: Free Press, 2008, p. 50.
[4] "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) New York Air Route Center Interview With Peter McCloskey." 9/11 Commission, October 1, 2003.
[5] FAA Audio File, Herndon Command Center, Position 14. Federal Aviation Administration, September 11, 2001.
[6] 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 8.
[7] FAA Audio File, New York Center, Position R42, 8:51 a.m.-9:10 a.m. Federal Aviation Administration, September 11, 2001; "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) New York Air Route Center Interview With David Bottiglia"; "The Hunt for American Air Eleven After WTC 1 is Hit." 9/11 Commission, n.d.
[8] Christopher G. Morris (Editor), Academic Press Dictionary of Science and Technology. San Diego, CA: Academic Press, 1992, p. 739; U.S. Army Field Manual FM 3-04.300: Airfield and Flight Operations Procedures. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2008, p. E-6.
[9] "Regulatory Brief: Emergency Locator Transmitters (ELTs)." Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, January 22, 2009.
[10] "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) New York Air Route Center Interview With Paul Thumser." 9/11 Commission, October 1, 2003.
[11] "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Interview With Terry Biggio, Facility Deputy Manager, Boston Center." 9/11 Commission, September 22, 2003.
[12] "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) New York Air Route Center (ZNY) Follow-up Interview With Mike McCormick." 9/11 Commission, December 15, 2003.
[13] "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) New York Air Route Center Interview With Mike McCormick, Air Traffic Manager." 9/11 Commission, October 1, 2003.
[14] Note that while ELTs are activated in a majority of aircraft crashes, they are not perfect, and have sometimes failed to go off when planes have crashed. See "Regulatory Brief: Emergency Locator Transmitters (ELTs)."
[15] "Emergency Locator Transmitters." Federal Aviation Administration, April 2, 1990.
[16] "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) New York Air Route Center Interview With Paul Thumser"; "Air Force Rescue Coordination Center." U.S. Air Force, November 12, 2008.
[17] "Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) New York Air Route Center Interview With Paul Thumser."

Thursday 12 August 2010

'Let's Get Rid of This Goddamn Sim': How NORAD Radar Screens Displayed False Tracks All Through the 9/11 Attacks


NORAD's Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center
Military personnel responsible for defending U.S. airspace had false tracks displayed on their radar screens throughout the entire duration of the 9/11 attacks, as part of the simulation for a training exercise being conducted that day. Technicians at NORAD's Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) were still receiving the simulated radar information around the time the third attack, on the Pentagon, took place. Those at NORAD's operations center in Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado, were still receiving it several minutes after United Airlines Flight 93 apparently crashed in rural Pennsylvania.

No one has investigated why false tracks continued being injected onto NORAD radar screens long after the U.S. military was alerted to the real-world crisis taking place that morning. And yet we surely need to know more about these simulated "inputs" and what effect they had on the military's ability to respond to the 9/11 attacks.

NEADS TECHNICIANS TOLD TO TURN OFF 'SIM SWITCHES'
The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 took place in airspace that was the responsibility of NEADS, based in Rome, New York. NEADS was therefore responsible for trying to coordinate the military's response to the hijackings. And yet, in the middle of it all, at 9:30 a.m. that morning a member of staff on the NEADS operations floor complained about simulated material that was appearing on the NEADS radar screens. He said: "You know what, let's get rid of this goddamn sim. Turn your sim switches off. Let's get rid of that crap." [1] Four minutes later, Technical Sergeant Jeffrey Richmond gave an instruction to the NEADS surveillance technicians, "All surveillance, turn off your sim switches." (A "sim switch" presumably allows a technician to either display or turn off any simulated material on their radar screen.) [2]

This means that at least some of the radar scopes at NEADS were still displaying simulated information--presumably false tracks--57 minutes after an air traffic controller at the FAA's Boston Center called there and announced: "We have a problem here. We have a hijacked aircraft headed towards New York." Forty-eight minutes had passed since the first attack on the World Trade Center occurred, and 31 minutes since the second tower was hit and it became obvious that the U.S. was under attack. It was only three minutes after Richmond gave his instruction, at 9:37 a.m., that the Pentagon was struck in the third successful attack that morning. [3]

Why were NEADS radar scopes displaying simulated information for so long during the real-world crisis, when it appears the technicians could have removed that information at the flick of a switch? Surely any false tracks could have hindered the ability of NEADS personnel to effectively respond to the attacks, so should have been terminated at the first sign of an actual emergency.

And yet this inexplicable behavior was not an exception. A similar thing happened at NORAD's Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center (CMOC) in Colorado, where it appears that false radar tracks were being displayed for even longer than at NEADS.

NORAD OPERATIONS CENTER ASKS FOR 'EXERCISE INPUTS' TO BE STOPPED
At 10:12 a.m., an officer at the NORAD operations center, "Captain Taylor," called NEADS and spoke to Captain Brian Nagel, the chief of live exercises there. After introducing himself, Taylor said, "What we need you to do right now is to terminate all exercise inputs coming into Cheyenne Mountain." Nagel gave Taylor an extension number and asked him to call it to get the exercise inputs stopped. Taylor replied, "I'll do that." [4] "Inputs," according to an article in Vanity Fair, are simulated scenarios that are put into play by a simulations team during training exercises. [5]

Taylor was presumably referring specifically to false tracks that had been transmitted onto radar screens at the CMOC, where more than 50 members of the battle staff had been participating in the exercise conducted that morning. [6] Indeed, the Toronto Star reported, "Any simulated information, what's known as an 'inject'" was "purged from the screens" at the CMOC in response to the news of the real-world attacks. (However, the report indicated, apparently incorrectly, that the false tracks appearing on CMOC screens were terminated earlier on, at some time shortly before 9:03 a.m., when the second WTC tower was hit.) [7]

If simulated material was still being displayed on CMOC radar screens at 10:12 a.m., this would be astonishing. By that time, 95 minutes had passed since--according to the 9/11 Commission--the military was first alerted to the hijacking of American Airlines Flight 11, and more than an hour had passed since the second plane hit the WTC. Flight 93 had apparently crashed in a field in rural Pennsylvania minutes earlier, and so the 9/11 attacks were already over. [8]

Why did it take so long for someone at the CMOC to call NEADS and ask it to "terminate all exercise inputs coming into Cheyenne Mountain?" Surely any simulated information should have been stopped as soon as NORAD learned of the real-world crisis taking place that morning.

The operations center was certainly in a valuable position to assist in the response to the terrorist attacks, so the intrusion of false tracks on its radar screens would presumably have considerably impaired the emergency response capabilities of the military. Airman magazine described the CMOC as the "nerve center of NORAD," and its troops as "the eyes and ears of North America ... nothing escapes their unsleeping watch." [9] According to the Toronto Star, "Whether it's a simulation or a real-world event, the role of the center is to fuse every critical piece of information NORAD has into a concise and crystalline snapshot." [10] NORAD has stated that the center collected data "from a worldwide system of satellites, radars, and other sensors, and processes that information on sophisticated computer systems to support critical NORAD and U.S. Space Command missions."

The CMOC provided "warning of ballistic missile or air attacks against North America, assists the air sovereignty mission for the United States and Canada, and, if necessary, is the focal point for air defense operations to counter enemy bombers or cruise missiles." The Battle Management Center there provided "command and control for the air surveillance and air defense network for North America." In 1994, for example, it monitored over 700 "unknown" radar tracks that entered North American airspace. [11]

NORAD INJECTS SIMULATED RADAR INFORMATION DURING EXERCISES
Simulated information was being transmitted onto radar screens the morning of September 11 as part of an annual command post exercise called Vigilant Guardian. All of NORAD, including NEADS, was participating in this exercise, which has been described as a "simulated air war" and as "an air defense exercise simulating an attack on the United States." [12]

An information page on Vigilant Guardian stated: "All of NEADS, operations personnel are to have their sim switches turned 'on' starting at 1400Z 6 Sept. 01 till endex [the end date of the exercise, which was originally going to be September 13]." The information page added, "A sim test track will be in place and forward told [i.e. transferred to a higher level of command] to both NORAD and CONR," NORAD's Continental United States Region. Presumably this was why the NORAD operations center needed to contact NEADS in order to get the "exercise inputs" terminated. [13]

A memo outlining special instructions for Vigilant Guardian participants described how their equipment needed to be set up to deal with the simulated material. It stated: "The exercise will be conducted sim over live on the air sovereignty string. The Q-93 must be placed in the mixed mode to allow the telling [i.e. the communicating of information between facilities] of sim tracks." [14]

The Q-93 was an important piece of equipment used by NORAD, described as "a suite of computers and peripheral equipment configured to receive plot data from ground radar systems." [15] It had "connectivity to numerous domestic radar sites, receives flight plans from the FAA, and has bi-directional communications with NORAD headquarters and a real-time link to AWACS [Airborne Warning and Control System planes]." It performed "real-time surveillance, identification, and weapons control missions." [16]

According to Master Sergeant Joseph McCain, the NEADS mission crew commander technician, "Q-93 radar screens have the ability to run a multiple input wartime scenario." [17] Indeed, in 1999, then-Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre revealed that NORAD could inject "mass attacks" onto its radar screens. [18] In December 1998, for example, it conducted an exercise called Vigilant Virgo, which reportedly "analyzed the Y2K preparedness of the entire ground radar array network. These systems were put through a series of scenarios involving tactical warning." [19] During this exercise, NORAD "injected 30 plus, well over 30 missile events into [its] sensors." This was "data that was injected as though it was being sensed for the first time by a radar site," according to Hamre. Of the more than 30 different simulated scenarios, some were "mass attacks" while others involved just "single missiles." [20]

WHEN WAS VIGILANT GUARDIAN TERMINATED?
Since NEADS and the NORAD operations center were still receiving simulated radar information long after the 9/11 attacks began, this raises the question of when exactly Vigilant Guardian was brought to an end. According to some accounts, it was called off "shortly after" 9:03 a.m., when the second WTC tower was hit. [21] However, when at 9:15 a.m. a caller asked, "Did they suspend the exercise?" NEADS tracking technician Mark Jennings replied, "Not at this time, no." Jennings continued, "I think they're going to," but added, "I don't know." [22]

In fact, one military newspaper has indicated that Vigilant Guardian may have been terminated more than half an hour after the attacks ended. According to the military information website, GlobalSecurity.org, Vigilant Guardian was held each year in conjunction with a U.S. Strategic Command (Stratcom) exercise called Global Guardian, and a 1997 Department of Defense report similarly listed Vigilant Guardian as one of several exercises that Global Guardian "links with." [23]

An article in The Bombardier, the newspaper for Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana, stated that Stratcom ordered a pause in Global Guardian at 9:11 a.m. on September 11, but only "formally terminated" this exercise at 10:44 a.m. [24] Considering that false tracks were still being displayed on NORAD radar screens at 10:12 a.m., and that NORAD's exercise that day was held in conjunction with Global Guardian, did Vigilant Guardian similarly continue until around 10:44 a.m. before being "formally terminated"?

CRITICAL QUESTIONS
The fact that key NEADS and NORAD operations center personnel had false information appearing on their radar screens throughout the 9/11 attacks raises critical questions that have yet to be investigated. We need to know who was responsible for transmitting the simulated "exercise inputs" to radar scopes. It has been reported that there was a "simulations team" working at NEADS the morning of September 11. [25] Was this team putting out the false tracks? If so, who were its members? Why did they continue with the simulation when it should have been obvious that a real-world crisis was taking place? And why didn't their higher-ups order them to stop transmitting the false tracks?

We also need to find out how many radar scopes at NEADS, the CMOC, and other NORAD facilities across the U.S. were receiving the simulated information. And what scenarios were transmitted onto the screens? Considering that Vigilant Guardian has been described as a "simulated air war," one would assume that many false tracks were being displayed.

Furthermore, we need to find out if personnel were able to distinguish genuine radar tracks from the simulated ones. It is worth noting that, since the mid-1990s, a tool called the PAC-3 Mobile Flight Mission Simulator (MFMS) has been available, which is capable of simulating a variety of enemy air vehicles. The MFMS was used by the U.S. Army in training exercises prior to 9/11. Crucially, it has been reported that "the graphic representations of MFMS tracks" on radar screens were "no different than those of actual tracks." To distinguish between real and simulated tracks, an operator had to observe the "Identify Friend or Foe" response of a track. "Simply, a real aircraft will generate an interrogation response whereas the simulated aircraft will return no response." [26]

If NORAD used equipment that simulated enemy aircraft in a similar way to the MFMS, this would presumably mean the task of distinguishing between real and false radar tracks on September 11 was less than straightforward, especially considering that three of the four aircraft targeted that day had their transponders turned off. [27] These aircraft would therefore not have been transmitting anything like an "Identify Friend or Foe" signal.

In sum, we need to determine the extent to which the U.S. military was hindered in its ability to respond on 9/11 as a result of its radar scopes receiving simulated information throughout the terrorist attacks.

It seems possible that the injection of false radar information could have been one way that normal emergency responses were sabotaged, so as to ensure the success of the attacks on New York and Washington, DC. If that is the case, those responsible must be investigated and brought to justice.

NOTES
[1] NEADS Audio File, Mission Crew Commander Position, Channel 2. North American Aerospace Defense Command, September 11, 2001; Transcripts From Voice Recorder, Northeast Air Defense Sector, Rome, NY. North American Aerospace Defense Command, September 11, 2001.
[2] NEADS Audio File, Air Surveillance Technician Position, Channel 15. North American Aerospace Defense Command, September 11, 2001; NEADS Communications 9:20 a.m.-9:54 a.m. September 11, 2001. 9/11 Commission, n.d.
[3] 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004, pp. 20, 22, 27.
[4] NEADS Audio File, Senior Director Position, Channel 20. North American Aerospace Defense Command, September 11, 2001.
[5] Michael Bronner, "9/11 Live: The NORAD Tapes." Vanity Fair, August 2006.
[6] Jason Tudor, "Inner Space." Airman, March 2002; "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With NORAD Deputy Commander, Lieutenant General Rick Findley, Canadian Forces (CF)." 9/11 Commission, March 1, 2004.
[7] Scott Simmie, "The Scene at NORAD on Sept. 11: Playing Russian War Games ... And Then Someone Shouted to Look at the Monitor." Toronto Star, December 9, 2001.
[8] 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 20, 22, 30.
[9] Pat McKenna, "The Border Guards." Airman, January 1996.
[10] Scott Simmie, "The Scene at NORAD on Sept. 11."
[11] "Cheyenne Mountain." North American Aerospace Defense Command, November 27, 1999.
[12] Leslie Filson, Air War Over America: Sept. 11 Alters Face of Air Defense Mission. Tyndall Air Force Base, FL: 1st Air Force, 2003, pp. 55, 122; William M. Arkin, Code Names: Deciphering U.S. Military Plans, Programs, and Operations in the 9/11 World. Hanover, NH: Steerforth Press, 2005, p. 545; "Vigilant Guardian." GlobalSecurity.org, April 27, 2005.
[13] "Vigilant Guardian 01-2." Northeast Air Defense Sector, August 23, 2001.
[14] Neil A. Cleveland, "Special Instructions (Spins) Vigilant Guardian 01-2." Northeast Air Defense Sector, August 23, 2001.
[15] John B. Stephenson, Sally M. Obenski, and Paula Bridickas, Mission-Critical Systems: Defense Attempting to Address Major Software Challenges. Washington, DC: United States General Accounting Office, December 1992, p. 17; "AN/FYQ-93 Communications System." Federation of American Scientists, April 23, 2000.
[16] Charles P. Satterthwaite, David E. Corman, and Thomas S. Herm, "Real-Time Information Extraction for Homeland Defense." Air Force Research Laboratory, June 2002.
[17] "Memorandum for the Record: North Eastern Air Defense Sector (NEADS) Field Site Visit." 9/11 Commission, October 28, 2003.
[18] John J. Hamre, "Dr. Hamre's Briefing on Year 2000 Issues." U.S. Department of Defense, January 15, 1999.
[19] Michael Kraig, "Safe or Sorry: The 'Y2K Problem' and Nuclear Weapons." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 1999; William M. Arkin, Code Names, p. 546.
[20] John J. Hamre, "Dr. Hamre's Briefing on Year 2000 Issues."
[21] Jason Tudor, "Inner Space"; Leslie Filson, Air War Over America, p. 59.
[22] NEADS Audio File, Identification Technician Position, Channel 7. North American Aerospace Defense Command, September 11, 2001.
[23] Nuclear Weapon Systems Sustainment Programs. Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, May 1997; "Vigilant Guardian."
[24] "Unlikely Chain of Events." The Bombardier, September 8, 2006. Note that the times given in this article are in Central time, which I have converted to Eastern time.
[25] Lynn Spencer, Touching History: The Untold Story of the Drama That Unfolded in the Skies Over America on 9/11. New York: Free Press, 2008, p. 25.
[26] Andrew Yuliano, "Simulations: Changing the Paradigm for Air Defense Operational Testing." Air Defense Artillery, April 2001.
[27] 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 16.

Tuesday 27 July 2010

NORAD Exercise a Year Before 9/11 Simulated a Pilot Trying to Crash a Plane into a New York Skyscraper--The United Nations Headquarters


The UN headquarters building and the Statue of Liberty
The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) held a major training exercise in October 2000 that included the scenario of a person stealing a large jet plane, which they planned to crash into the United Nations headquarters building--a 39-story high-rise in New York, just a few miles away from the World Trade Center. Furthermore, a NORAD exercise in June that year included one scenario in which a plane was hijacked with the intention of crashing it into the White House, and another in which a transcontinental flight was hijacked with the intention of crashing the plane into the Statue of Liberty, only a short distance from where the WTC stood.

The existence of these exercise scenarios was revealed in August 2004 by General Richard Myers, at that time the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, during a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Senator Mark Dayton (D-MN) asked, "Did NORAD"-- the military organization responsible for defending U.S. airspace--"conduct exercises or develop scenarios, prior to September 11, 2001, to test a military reaction to an aircraft hijacking which appeared destined to result in a suicide crash into a high-value target?" In response, Myers outlined "five exercise hijack events" that NORAD had practiced for between November 1999 and October 2000, which all "included a suicide crash into a high-value target." [1] Yet the details of these chilling scenarios, which were like premonitions of the attacks on New York and Washington that lay ahead, failed to receive the public attention they deserved.

OCTOBER 2000 SCENARIO: STOLEN PLANE TARGETS UN BUILDING
The scenario that included an attempt to crash a plane into the UN headquarters was practiced for twice--on October 16 and October 23, 2000--as part of an exercise called Vigilant Guardian. This annual exercise was conducted by NORAD, and all of the organization, including its headquarters and its three air defense sectors in the continental United States, participated. [2]

The scenario practiced for on October 16 was that, "Due to recent arrests involving illegal drug trafficking in Maine, an individual steals a Federal Express plane and plans a suicide attack into the United Nations building in New York City." The October 23 scenario, according to Myers's summary, was almost identical. It was based around "weapons of mass destruction directed at the United Nations," and in it, "an individual steals a Federal Express aircraft and plans a suicide attack on the United Nations building in New York City." [3] (At the time of this exercise, Federal Express was flying mostly the MD-11 and the DC-10, both large jet aircraft. Presumably one of those planes was the type considered in the scenarios. [4])

The next Vigilant Guardian--for the year 2001--was actually being conducted at the time the 9/11 attacks occurred. [5] One can only imagine what NORAD personnel must have thought when the real-world events of September 11 so closely resembled a scenario they had encountered in the previous instance of that day's exercise--a suicide pilot trying to crash a large jet plane into a New York skyscraper.

JUNE 2000 SCENARIOS: HIJACKERS PLAN TO CRASH PLANES INTO WHITE HOUSE AND STATUE OF LIBERTY
On June 5, 2000, the Continental United States NORAD Region (CONR) was conducting an exercise called Falcon Indian, in which its three air defense sectors in the continental U.S. took part. [6] Two scenarios were practiced for that day in which hijackers planned to crash an aircraft into a well-known, "high-value" target in New York or Washington.

One scenario involved a Learjet being hijacked, and "maintaining tight formation with [a] Canadair airliner, loaded with explosives," according to Myers's summary. (It is unclear from that summary whether it was the Learjet or the Canadair plane that had explosives on board.) The hijackers "planned to crash" the Learjet "into the White House." In the other scenario, a "Communist Party faction" hijacked an aircraft bound from the western to the eastern United States. The hijackers had "high explosives on board," and intended "to crash into the Statue of Liberty." [7]

NOVEMBER 1999 SCENARIO: TERRORISTS PLAN TO CRASH HIJACKED PLANE INTO UN BUILDING
The fifth scenario Myers described was from an earlier Falcon Indian, held in November 1999. Again, NORAD's three air defense sectors in the continental U.S. took part in the CONR exercise. And, again, the exercise included a scenario based around the hijacking of a transcontinental aircraft flying from the western to the eastern United States. In the simulation, a China Airlines plane bound from Los Angeles to JFK International Airport in New York was "hijacked east of Colorado Springs by five terrorists." If the plane was not intercepted by the U.S. military, the hijackers intended "to crash into [the] United Nations building." [8]

OTHER PRE-9/11 PLANE-INTO-BUILDING SCENARIOS
Just a few months before Richard Myers revealed the existence of these five exercise scenarios, USA Today and CNN reported that NORAD had conducted exercises in the years before 9/11 that simulated hijackers crashing aircraft into buildings in the United States. Some of the scenarios that had been practiced for were described. It is unclear whether any of them correspond with the five later outlined by Myers, although, from what has been reported, it appears they were separate scenarios, additional to those in Myers's list.

USA Today reported that "in the two years before the September 11 attacks," NORAD conducted exercises simulating "hijacked airliners used as weapons to crash into targets and cause mass casualties." In one exercise, "One of the imagined targets was the World Trade Center." Another exercise involved fighter jets performing "a mock shootdown over the Atlantic Ocean of a jet supposedly laden with chemical poisons headed toward a target in the United States." These two scenarios were included in "regional drills, not regularly scheduled continent-wide exercises," according to NORAD, and the planes in the simulations were coming from a foreign country, rather than from within the U.S. [9]

CNN reported, "Sometime between 1991 and 2001, a regional sector of the North American Aerospace Defense Command simulated a foreign hijacked airliner crashing into a building in the United States as part of [a] training exercise scenario." That scenario involved the airliner "being hijacked as it flew into U.S. airspace from abroad." The exercise "was conducted at one regional sector, and was not conducted at the [NORAD] headquarters." The identity of the building hit by the aircraft was classified, but military officials said that it "would be recognizable if identified, but was not the World Trade Center or the Pentagon." [10]

How could it have happened that the organization responsible for defending U.S. airspace repeatedly practiced scenarios that so closely resembled the 9/11 attacks in the years leading up to those attacks? And considering that the existence of these plane-into-building training scenarios has largely gone unreported, might there have been other, similar scenarios practiced for by NORAD--or other U.S. military organizations--that we do not yet know of? A new investigation into 9/11 is clearly urgently required. And the role of these training scenarios is one of many aspects of the attacks that must be thoroughly examined.

NOTES
[1] Senate Committee on Armed Services, Implications for the Department of Defense and Military Operations of Proposals to Reorganize the United States Intelligence Community. 108th Cong., 2nd sess., August 17, 2004.
[2] Ibid.; William M. Arkin, Code Names: Deciphering U.S. Military Plans, Programs, and Operations in the 9/11 World. Hanover, NH: Steerforth Press, 2005, p. 545.
[3] Senate Committee on Armed Services, Implications for the Department of Defense and Military Operations of Proposals to Reorganize the United States Intelligence Community.
[4] Greg Schneider, "FedEx to Buy 10 Airbus Super-Jumbo Jets." Washington Post, January 17, 2001.
[5] William M. Arkin, Code Names, p. 545.
[6] Senate Committee on Armed Services, Implications for the Department of Defense and Military Operations of Proposals to Reorganize the United States Intelligence Community; William M. Arkin, Code Names, p. 362.
[7] Senate Committee on Armed Services, Implications for the Department of Defense and Military Operations of Proposals to Reorganize the United States Intelligence Community.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Steven Komarow and Tom Squitieri, "NORAD Had Drills of Jets as Weapons." USA Today, April 18, 2004.
[10] Barbara Starr, "NORAD Exercise Had Jet Crashing into Building." CNN, April 19, 2004.

Friday 18 June 2010

The Actions and Inactions of the Commander in Charge of the U.S. Air Defense Failure on 9/11


Ralph Eberhart

"During those entire 109 minutes ... this country
and its citizens were completely undefended."

- Senator Mark Dayton

General Ralph Eberhart was the commander in chief of NORAD--the military organization responsible for defending U.S. airspace--when the 9/11 attacks occurred. Considering that NORAD failed to intercept any of the four aircraft targeted in the attacks and successfully defend New York and Washington, one would reasonably expect Eberhart to have been somehow held to account. And yet that did not happen.

In fact, nine years on, we still know very little about what Eberhart did while the 9/11 attacks were taking place. From what we do know, his actions seem far from reassuring. Eberhart at least gave the impression of having an unclear picture of what was going on. Accounts of his actions reveal no decisive attempts to respond to the attacks. He appears to have been particularly slow to order a plan that would give the military control of U.S. airspace and get all aircraft grounded. Furthermore, in the middle of the attacks, he decided to drive from his office at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado, to NORAD's operations center in Cheyenne Mountain--a journey that apparently put him out of the loop for about an hour.

EBERHART'S ACTIONS ON 9/11
Ralph Eberhart began the morning of September 11, 2001 at NORAD headquarters at Peterson Air Force Base. [1] He told the 9/11 Commission that he learned of the crisis that was unfolding when the command director at NORAD's Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center (presumably Captain Michael Jellinek) called at 8:45 a.m.--one minute before the first World Trade Center tower was hit--and "informed him of the ongoing circumstance of a suspected hijacking on the East Coast." Eberhart subsequently went to his office and saw the television coverage of the first attack on the WTC.

He "asked if the aircraft that was suspected of impacting the World Trade Center was the same aircraft that was a suspected hijack, and was told that they were not." Eberhart has recalled that there was apparently "great confusion in the system" at this time. But after news broke of the second attack on the WTC, he said, it was "obvious" to him that there was "an ongoing and coordinated terrorist attack" taking place. [2] And yet his subsequent actions were hardly impressive, considering the urgency of the situation.

Eberhart tried contacting General Henry Shelton, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but was unable to, since Shelton was airborne at the time, on his way to a NATO meeting in Europe. Eberhart then "contacted higher command authority at the Pentagon," he has recalled. [3]

He also spoke briefly with General Richard Myers, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who was on Capitol Hill, where he had been meeting with Senator Max Cleland. At some point between 9:03 a.m. and 9:30 a.m., according to Myers's recollection, Eberhart phoned the vice chairman's military aide on his cell phone, which the aide then passed to Myers.

EBERHART UNCLEAR ABOUT DETAILS OF HIJACKINGS AND NORAD'S RESPONSE
Eberhart updated Myers on the crisis, telling him the two WTC towers had been hit and there were "several hijack codes in the system." This, according to Myers, meant "that the transponders in the aircraft [were] talking to the ground, and they're saying ... we're being hijacked." [4] However, if Myers's recollection is correct, Eberhart was apparently either mistaken or deliberately giving false information: None of the pilots of the four flights targeted that morning keyed the code that would indicate a hijacking into their plane's transponder. [5] There should have been no "hijack codes in the system" at that time.

Eberhart told Myers he was working with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to get all aircraft over the U.S. to land. He also said NORAD would be launching fighter jets in response to the attacks. [6] As Myers would recall two days later, "I think the decision was, at that point, to start launching aircraft." [7] However, NORAD's Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS), based in upstate New York, had already launched fighters by that time: Two F-15s had taken off from Otis Air National Guard Base in Massachusetts at 8:46 a.m. [8] So if Myers's account is correct, Eberhart--the man in charge of NORAD--was apparently either unaware of the actions of NORAD's Northeast Air Defense Sector or knowingly giving out false information.

Furthermore, when he was interviewed by the 9/11 Commission in March 2004, Eberhart claimed he'd had "no knowledge of the circumstances that initiated the scramble" of fighter jets from Langley Air Force Base in Virginia at 9:24 a.m. [9] Extensive evidence uncovered by the Commission showed that NEADS scrambled those fighters in response to an incorrect report it had received that American Airlines Flight 11--which hit the WTC at 8:46 a.m.--was still airborne and heading south, toward Washington, DC. [10] At the time of his 9/11 Commission interview, Eberhart said, he had only "recently" been made aware of these circumstances. [11] How could the man in charge of NORAD on September 11 have been unaware of such crucial information for nearly two and a half years after the attacks occurred?

After learning of the attacks in New York, Eberhart stayed at Building 1 at Peterson Air Force Base--the headquarters of the Air Force Space Command, which, as well as NORAD, he was the commander of--because, he said, "he did not want to lose communication." [12] However, he soon set out on a journey that caused him to lose communication with others involved in the emergency response for 45 minutes or longer.

EBERHART OUT OF COMMUNICATION WHILE TRAVELING TO OPERATIONS CENTER
At "approximately 9:30," according to his own recollection, Eberhart left Peterson Air Force Base and headed to the NORAD operations center in Cheyenne Mountain. [13] The operations center was about 12 miles away, a journey that takes "roughly 30 minutes," according to the 9/11 Commission Report. But, as the Washington Post noted, "The trip to Cheyenne Mountain can be time-consuming if traffic is bad," and the drive took Eberhart 45 minutes. [14]

The journey may in fact have taken even longer. Eberhart told the 9/11 Commission that by the time he arrived at the operations center, the authorization for the military to shoot down threatening aircraft had been passed down NORAD's chain of command. NORAD finally passed on this authorization to its three air defense sectors at 10:31 a.m., which would imply that Eberhart reached the operations center shortly after that time, more than an hour after he said he left Peterson Air Force Base. [15]

Furthermore, while he was making the journey to Cheyenne Mountain, Eberhart "couldn't receive telephone calls as senior officials weighed how to respond," according to the Denver Post. [16] He reportedly "lost a cell phone call with Vice President Dick Cheney." The reason why Eberhart had problems receiving phone calls is unclear, though it has been reported that "New repeater stations were installed almost immediately" after 9/11, "to fix the phone problem." [17]

During the period when he was reportedly traveling to the operations center, at 9:49 a.m., Eberhart "directed all air sovereignty aircraft to battle stations, fully armed" over the Pentagon's air threat conference call, according to the 9/11 Commission Report. [18] Presumably he was either able to successfully issue this order himself despite his communication problems, or the order was issued on his behalf by a subordinate who was participating in the air threat conference call. However, when an aircraft is at "battle stations," its pilot is in the cockpit, but with the engines turned off, ready to start them and taxi out only if a scramble order should follow. [19] So Eberhart's order would have meant that any air sovereignty aircraft not already airborne would have remained on the ground, rather than immediately getting into the air, where they could have quickly intercepted a hostile aircraft.

The reason Eberhart decided to relocate to Cheyenne Mountain at such an important time, when his uninterrupted participation in the crisis response would presumably have been essential, is unclear. According to the Colorado Springs Gazette, the Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center "had communications capabilities not available at Peterson." [20] And Eberhart told the 9/11 Commission that, on his communications loop, it had "quieted down" before he decided to head out to the mountain. [21]

All the same, if Eberhart's account of his actions is correct, it would mean that, in the middle of the worst terrorist attack in the history of the U.S., the commander of NORAD was, at least to some degree, out of the loop for maybe an hour or more.

MILITARY ONLY TAKES CONTROL OF SKIES AFTER ATTACKS ENDED
The one key action Ralph Eberhart is known to have taken in response to the 9/11 attacks was to implement a modified version of a plan called "SCATANA," which would clear the skies and give the military control over U.S. airspace. However, Eberhart only ordered that this plan be put into operation at around 11:00 a.m., about two hours after the second WTC tower was hit and it became "obvious" to him that a coordinated terrorist attack was taking place.

When he was asked before the 9/11 Commission why it had taken so long to initiate the plan, Eberhart recalled that people had been approaching him and telling him to "declare SCATANA." However, he added, NORAD "could not control the airspace that day with the radars we had and all the aircraft that were airborne. ... So, if I suddenly say, 'We've got it, we will control the airspace,' we would have had worse problems than we had that morning because I cannot provide [air] traffic deconfliction like the FAA has."

Eberhart therefore requested that a modified version of SCATANA be devised, telling those that were calling for the plan, "I will execute SCATANA once you have a modified SCATANA that clearly delineates the lines in the road and doesn't cause a bad situation to become worse." The modified SCATANA that Eberhart subsequently implemented allowed navigational aids to stay on, and selective approval for specific and necessary flights. [22]

Eberhart was implying to the 9/11 Commission that his delay in ordering SCATANA was due to the time required to put together this modified version of it. However, he has not specified the time at which he asked his colleagues to start preparing the modified SCATANA. Was it at 9:03 a.m., when the second WTC tower was hit and everyone realized that the U.S. was under attack--a time when the value of such a plan would presumably have been obvious? Or was it later on? If later on, how much later?

AMERICA 'COMPLETELY UNDEFENDED' DURING ATTACKS
A fuller analysis of Ralph Eberhart's actions on September 11 will only be possible when more evidence comes to light revealing what he did at the time of the attacks. It seems remarkable that we still know so little about the actions of the man who, as commander of NORAD, was in charge of the air defense of the U.S. In that role, Eberhart oversaw a catastrophic failure, which, in the words of Senator Mark Dayton, meant that for "109 minutes ... this country and its citizens were completely undefended." [23]

And yet, rather than being held accountable, or even just criticized, for that failure, in October 2002 Eberhart was put in charge of the newly created Northern Command (NORTHCOM), described as "the nation's premier military homeland defense organization," which had the mission of countering threats and aggression against the United States. [24]

As Dayton concluded, "The situation is urgent when we do not get protected in those circumstances [that occurred on 9/11], and it is even worse when it is covered up." [25]

NOTES
[1] 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004, p. 465.
[2] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With CINC NORAD (Commander in Chief NORAD), General Edward 'Ed' Eberhart." 9/11 Commission, March 1, 2004.
[3] Ibid.; Richard Myers with Malcolm McConnell, Eyes on the Horizon: Serving on the Front Lines of National Security. New York: Threshold Editions, 2009, p. 10.
[4] Richard Myers, interview by Jim Miklaszewski. NBC News, September 11, 2002; "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Richard Myers, Affiliated With NORAD." 9/11 Commission, February 17, 2004; Richard Myers with Malcolm McConnell, Eyes on the Horizon, p. 9.
[5] "Government Official Has New Evidence Regarding Hijacked Airlines." CNN, September 11, 2001.
[6] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With Richard Myers, Affiliated With NORAD"; Richard Myers with Malcolm McConnell, Eyes on the Horizon, p. 9.
[7] Senate Armed Services Committee, U.S. Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) Holds Hearing on Nomination of General Richard Myers to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 107th Cong., 1st sess., September 13, 2001.
[8] 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 20.
[9] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With CINC NORAD (Commander in Chief NORAD), General Edward 'Ed' Eberhart."
[10] 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 26-27, 34.
[11] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With CINC NORAD (Commander in Chief NORAD), General Edward 'Ed' Eberhart."
[12] "General Ralph E. 'Ed' Eberhart." U.S. Air Force, February 2004; "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With CINC NORAD (Commander in Chief NORAD), General Edward 'Ed' Eberhart."
[13] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With CINC NORAD (Commander in Chief NORAD), General Edward 'Ed' Eberhart."
[14] 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 465; T. R. Reid, "Military to Idle NORAD Compound." Washington Post, July 29, 2006.
[15] 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 42; Lynn Spencer, Touching History: The Untold Story of the Drama That Unfolded in the Skies Over America on 9/11. New York: Free Press, 2008, p. 240.
[16] Bruce Finley, "Military to Put Cheyenne Mountain on Standby." Denver Post, July 27, 2006.
[17] Pam Zubeck, "Cheyenne Mountain's Fate May Lie in Study Contents." Colorado Springs Gazette, June 16, 2006.
[18] 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 38, 463.
[19] Leslie Filson, Air War Over America: Sept. 11 Alters Face of Air Defense Mission. Tyndall Air Force Base, FL: 1st Air Force, 2003, p. 55; Lynn Spencer, Touching History, p. 27.
[20] Pam Zubeck, "Cheyenne Mountain's Fate May Lie in Study Contents."
[21] "Memorandum for the Record: Interview With CINC NORAD (Commander in Chief NORAD), General Edward 'Ed' Eberhart."
[22] William B. Scott, "Exercise Jump-Starts Response to Attacks." Aviation Week & Space Technology, June 3, 2002; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States: Twelfth Public Hearing. 9/11 Commission, June 17, 2004; Lynn Spencer, Touching History, p. 269.
[23] Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Making America Safer: Examining the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. 108th Cong., 2nd sess., July 30, 2004.
[24] Gerry J. Gilmore, "Eberhart Tabbed to Head U.S. Northern Command." American Forces Press Service, May 8, 2002; "Key Players: Commander, Northern Command, Gen. Ralph Eberhart." Government Executive, April 15, 2003.
[25] Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Making America Safer: Examining the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.